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CHAPTER 22 
Workmen's Compensation 
LARRY ALAN BEAR 
The period October 1, 1953, through October 1, 1954, was most 
active in the field of workmen's compensation. A great many bills 
were submitted to the General Court advocating broad changes in and 
additions to the present law. The bills enacted into law are discussed 
herein. A complete recodification of the entire act was proposed, and 
though not passed this year, is still under consideration. There is 
little question that this proposed recodification is one of the most 
important, and most controversial, legislative developments in the 
field since the inception of the Workman's Compensation Act in 1911. 
Nineteen cases, each involving one or more provisions of the Act 
(Chapter 152 of the General Laws) were decided by the Supreme 
Judicial Court in this period. Although some of these merely clarify 
existing law, a number of decisions are deserving of comment because 
of their decisive effect on various provisions and policies in the field. 
A. COURT DECISIONS 
§22.1. "Arising out of and in the course of employment." Two 
of the most interesting cases decided in the compensation field during 
the survey' year involved the fundamental dual problem of injuries 
arising out of and in the course of employment. In one case 1 the 
Court held that a book salesman who received gunshot injuries while 
chasing a man who had just shot his prospective customer did not 
receive an injury arising out of and in the course of his employment. 
The Court states that the claimant voluntarily departed from the 
duties of his employment when he chased the unknown assailant. The 
Court expressly left open decision in a case where the conditions or 
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§21.15 STATE AND LOCAL TAXATION 227 
Chapter 59, Section 5, Clause Seventeenth, to raise the maximum value 
of property occupied as a domicile, to which the $2000 exemption 
applies, from $2000 to $8000. Persons attaining the age of seventy are 
now eligible for the exemption if they have owned and occupied the 
property as a domicile for at least ten years. 
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§22.1 WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION 229 
obligations of the employment place the employee in a position where 
he may be called upon to save life or limb, e.g., protection of human 
life under the so-called "rescue" theory.2 
Perhaps the most interesting case decided recently by the Supreme 
Judicial Court falls under the heading of this section. In Collier's 
Case,s the claimant was a waitress in a restaurant. Her hours were 
from 8:00 P.M. until 1:00 A.M. At about 11:30 P.M. on the night she 
received her injuries, she refused to serve a customer a drink, in accord-
ance with the instructions of her employer, because the customer was 
already drunk. The customer became abusive and threatened her with 
physical harm. One hour later the employee went off duty. She had 
proceeded fifty-eight feet from the front door of the restaurant, on her 
way to public transportation home, when she was assaulted by the 
drunken customer, who was obviously lying in wait for her, and as a 
result she suffered a fractured hip. 
The single member of the Industrial Accident Board found, " ... 
what happened in the street was merely a continuation of the quarrel 
the customer had begun on the premises during the course of her 
employment and flowed from it as a rational consequence," 4 and 
awarded the employee compensation. The reviewing board, on appeal, 
affirmed and adopted the single member's findings, but nevertheless 
reversed the award of compensation as a matter of law, holding that 
the employee's injury was not received by her in the course of her 
employment. On certification to the Superior Court, the claim for 
compensation was dismissed. 
The Supreme Judicial Court in affirming the denial of the employee's 
claim, stated: 
The question before us is whether the reviewing board was right 
in denying compensation as a matter of law. The board undoubt-
edly could have found that the intent of the customer to assault 
the employee arose from her refusal to serve him liquor and that 
this intent continued from the time of the refusal to the time of 
the assault. But such continuance of cause alone was not suffi-
cient to warrant an award of compensation .... The altercation 
between the employee and the customer did not continue but 
ended when he abandoned his demand for a drink and left the 
restaurant. Thereafter an hour elapsed . . . the employee com-
pleted her work ... left her employer's premises, and walked 
along the street for a substantial distance. In these circumstances 
it could not be found that there was one continuing event and the 
board was right in ruling that the injuries of the employee were 
not received in the course of her employment.5 
• On the rescue doctrine see 1 Larson, Workmen's Compensation §§28.21, 28.23, 
28.32 (1952). 
31954 Mass. Adv. Sh. 419, 119 N.E.2d 191. 
41954 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 420,119 N.E.2d at 191. 
51954 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 421, 422, 119 N.E.2d at 192, 193. 
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The Court discussed the famous Cardozo opinion in Field v. Char-
mette Knitted Fabric CO.,6 affirming an award of compensation to a 
factory superintendent who was assaulted outside the building by an-
other employee with whom he had been arguing while on the job 
inside the factory. The assault occurred only three or four feet from 
the plant and within a few minutes after the argument. Justice Car-
dozo asserted: "The quarrel outside the mill was merely a confirmation 
or extension of the quarrel begun within .... Continuity of cause 
has been so combined with contiguity in time and space that the quarrel 
from origin to ending must be taken to be one." 7 
The Supreme Judicial Court in the Collier case did not assert that 
its decision conflicted with the Field case. It seemed to hold, rather, 
that although there may have been continuity of cause in so far as the 
worker's injury was concerned, there was not one continuing event, 
because an hour elapsed between the time of the altercation in the 
restaurant and the assault on the street, and because the employee 
had finished working, had left the employer's premises and had walked 
along the street for a "substantial distance" (fifty-eight feet).8 The 
Court expressly leaves open the question of its attitude toward a case 
which it would hold to be similar on its facts to the New York case.9 
The language of the Court and its use of the Field decision leaves 
unclear one of the most important issues in the case: Is the question 
of the employee's being in the course of her employment at the time 
of injury one of fact for the Board or one of law for the Court? 
There does not seem to be any question that the injury "arose out 
of" the employment. The decision seems to have turned on the factors 
of time and space. One might well question whether recovery for an 
assault of this type should depend on the distance from the place of 
work and the length of time after leaving work. The decision would 
seem to be justified only on the grounds that the Court felt· that 
whether the injury "arose out of" the employment was a question of 
fact for the Industrial Accident Board to determine. The Court does 
not make this clear, however. 
Unfortunately, only a series of decisions by the Supreme Judicial 
Court can give us the answer to our fact-or-law problem, for although 
the board can decide the question as a matter of fact in the first 
instance, the Court would ultimately have to pass on the issue as a 
matter of law. In other words, although the board might find that 
thirty-two feet and half an hour satisfy the space and time require-
ments, it is the Court which, in the end, will have to say that a finding 
of compensability (or noncompensability) by the Board is justifiable 
as a matter of law, under the individual circumstances of the particular 
case at bar,lo Therefore, only a series of decisions can establish pre-
8245 N.Y. 139, 156 N.E. 642 (1927). 
7245 N.Y. at 142, 156 N.E. at 643. 
• 1954 Mass. Adv. Sh. 4J9, 422, J J9 N.E.2d 191, 194. 
'19t;4 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 421,119 N.E.2d at 194. 
10 See jarek's Case, 326 Mass. 182, 93 N.E.2d 533 (1950). 
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dictable criteria for determining on which side of the line anyone 
case may fall. Without delving any deeper into the problems created 
by questions of fact, questions of law, and questions of mixed fact and 
law, it should be obvious that one result of the Collier decision will 
be to create an excessive amount of appellate litigation in these cases, 
an unfortunate result in any area of the law, but far more serious in 
the field of workmen's compensation, where broad unsettled questions 
and extensive appellate litigation have always been thought to be 
against the purposes of the system.H 
Let us postulate now a hypothetical situation based on facts similar 
to those in the Collier case. Assume that the assault took place five 
minutes after the argument, in the doorway of the employer's premises. 
In such a case it might be safe to assume that recovery would be 
allowed; certainly we could say that the chances of the employee's 
recovering here would be much greater than under the actual facts in 
Collier. 
But why should they be? 
'!Vould the assault, in our five-minute-doorway case, be any more 
an inherent part of the employment incident? Clearly not, for we 
cannot escape the fact that it was the work-connected argument which, 
in both cases, was the undisputed cause of the injuries received by 
the employee. 
In the final analysis, how soon after the argument must the assault 
come before an award of compensation is in order? Three minutes 
or thirty? How close to the premises must the employee be battered, 
seven feet or fifty-seven? The undisputed fact that the obvious origin 
of the assault was the employment should be the important factor. 
The required unity of the transaction should not be dependent upon 
inches and minutes, but rather upon demonstrable employment con-
nection. It might be well-nigh impossible, in terms of unity of time 
and space, to show such a connection, for example, in an assault which 
took place off the employer's premises a month after a work-connected 
altercation, but that would be solely a problem of proof, and the 
basic premise should remain the same. 
The true test of compensability in these delayed injury cases should 
rest upon the determination of whether or not the origin of the single 
unit of injury lies within the bounds of the employment; if it does, 
then whether the ending does, in the form of actual impact, is imma-
terial. 
Nowhere does our statute require that an injury must be consum-
mated in the course of the employment. It must arise in the course 
of the employment. If the Court would clearly differentiate between 
origin and completion, then a more perfect blending of "arising out 
of" and "in the course of" would be accomplished, and the essential 
11 On the background and history of the system, see Riesenfield, Forty Years of 
American Workmen's Compensation, 7 NACCA L.J. 15 (1951); Wambaugh, Work-
men's Compensation Acts, 25 Harv. L. Rev. 129 (1911). 
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purpose of the compensation act - to award benefits for injuries 
causally connected with the employment - would be fulfilled.12 
§22.2. "Specific" compensation. Every state compensation act has 
one or more sections in it calling for the payment of set sums for certain 
specified injuries resulting in actual loss or permanent loss of use of 
some member of the body. In some states these sums, referred to as 
"specific" payments, are deducted from the claimant's disability com-
pensation, in others the specific payments are in addition to disability 
compensation, but the claimant cannot receive both during the same 
period of time.1 In Massachusetts all specific payments are in addition 
to all other compensations.2 In addition to scheduled payments for 
loss of the various members, specific sums are provided for loss of 
bodily function 3 and for bodily disfigurement.4 Scheduled payments 
are at the rate of $20 per week for a specified number of weeks in the 
case of loss of members of the body, while in the case of bodily dis-
figurement and loss of function the number of weeks to be awarded 
is at the discretion of the Industrial Accident Board in each particular 
case. 
In those cases where leg, foot, arm, or hand injuries do not result 
in severance, but in permanent loss of use, either total or partial, the 
Board is empowered to award specific amounts just as if there had 
been severance, either total or partia1.5 A similar provision covers loss 
of use with or without severance, of fingers, toes, or other parts of 
hand or foot. 6 
The wording of the statute 7 is to the effect that severance, or loss 
of use of the fingers, toes, or other parts of the hand or foot are to be 
compensated for "in proportion to the period applicable in the event 
of total loss or total loss of use of said hand or foot as the functional 
loss arising out of said severed inutile part of said hand or foot bears 
to the total loss of use of the same." 
The Industrial Accident Board, in connection with Section 36, has 
drawn up, as a guide, a chart which sets out specified amounts to be 
paid for loss of use, by severance or otherwise, of each phalanx of each 
finger of each hand and all combinations of the phalanges thereof. 
In Roberge's Case,s the Supreme Judicial Court was faced with the 
difficult question - unanswered by the statute or the chart - of what 
compensation to give when an employee looses only a part of one 
phalanx of a finger. Here, the employee had lost %6 of an inch of 
12 Cf. Rogers v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 85 Ohio App. 421, 88 N.E.2d 234 (1945). 
§22.2. 1 For an excellent breakdown of various statutes on this point, the reader is 
referred to Analysis of Workmen's Compensation Laws (1954), prepared by the 
United States Chamber of Commerce, Washington, D.C. 
2 G.L., c. 152, §36. 
• Id. §36(i), as amended by Acts of 1949, c. 519. 
• Id. §36(h), as amended by Acts of 1949, c. 519. 
• Id. §36(q). 
• Id. §36(r). 
• Ibid. 
• 330 Mass. 506, 115 N.E.2d 459 (1953). 
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the distal phalanx of his right thumb while working on a planing 
machine. The Industrial Accident Board, in accordance with its 
established practice, awarded 33.75 weeks' specific compensation, the 
same as for loss of the entire phalanx. The Supreme Judicial Court, 
after rejecting the insurer's theory that the statutory section involved 9 
precluded recovery for anything less than total loss of the finger, re-
versed the board finding. The Court held that where there was loss 
of less than a complete phalanx, it was necessary to determine what 
proportion the functional loss of ~ 6 of an inch of the distal phalanx 
of the thumb bore to the functional loss of the hand. 
It is now necessary, therefore, in cases where less than an entire 
phalanx is lost, that the Board determine the loss of function suffered 
in relation to the single bodily member involved (for example, to the 
thumb as a whole or the index finger as a whole), and then determine 
the ratio of that loss to the loss of the entire member (for example, to 
the whole hand). 
Ostensibly, the Industrial Accident Board chart is based upon the 
proportional loss of function which each separate finger bears to the 
entire hand. One could question the reliability of such a chart, how-
ever, where all the medical testimony is in agreement as to percentage 
loss of function, and that agreed loss of function differs from the 
Board's set figure. 
Also, in connection with this chart, it might be pertinent here to 
note that there is something quite odd in the notion that the loss of 
function which a laborer sustains when he loses his fourth or ring 
finger, is exactly the same loss of function which a violinist sustains 
when he loses that same finger. Whether the Board would adhere to 
its standard chart in such a case, and whether, if it did, it would be 
upheld by the Court on appeal is an interesting question, and one that 
has yet to be decided. 
The specific compensation section covering loss of sight 10 was also 
clarified this year with regard to partial loss of sight. In Pizzano's 
Case 11 the employee suffered an industrial accident which reduced his 
vision to a ratio of 20/45. By statute, reduction of vision to 20/70 is 
equivalent to removal, or total loss of use, and an employee suffering 
such loss is entitled to 200 weeks of specific compensation. Reference 
to the Snellen Visual Acuity Chart shows that with 20/45 vision, one's 
sight is 20 percent less than normal, and with 20/70 vision, 36 percent 
less than normal. 
The Board found that the employee was entitled to compensation 
for 20/36 of 200 weeks, or 111 weeks. The insurer appealed on the 
ground that the proper award should have been 40 weeks for 20 percent 
loss of vision. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the Board's hold-
ing that industrial loss of sight, rather than total loss was the proper 
ratio base, stating, "The legislative history of the provisions of the 
• G.L., c. 152, §36(r). 
10Id. §36(a).(e). 
u 1954 Mass. Adv. Sh. 427, 119 N.E.2d 390. 
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workmen's compensation law manifests a strong tendency to liberalize 
those portions dealing with eye injuries." 12 
It is important to note here that the Pizzano case in no way deals 
with the problem of what a proper award ratio would be if the claimant 
had had less than 20/20 vision previous to his accident. Clearly that 
is still an open question in Massachusetts,13 
§22.3. Dependency allowances. Under the dependency section of 
our Workmen's Compensation Act,! a widow or widower whose spouse 
is killed in an industrial accident is entitled to receive compensation 
at the rate of $20 per week for 400 weeks plus $5 extra each week for 
each dependent child. After the expiration of 400 weeks, the widow 
or widower may, if not fully self-supporting, continue to receive 
these benefits. 
The 400 weeks' compensation that the widow or widower receives 
is not based upon need or social status; rather it is required that the 
insurer pay compensation for that period in any case, unless the sur-
viving spouse should die or remarry before such period expires. The 
statute states: "If there is no surviving wife ... of the deceased em-
ployee, such amount or amounts as would have been payable under 
this section to or for the use of a widow . . . and for the benefit of 
all such children of the employee shall be paid in equal shares to all 
such surviving children of the employee ... " The statute makes 
almost identical provision for the decedent's children in the case where 
there is a surviving spouse who dies after having received benefits 
under the dependency statute. 
In Canavan's Case 2 the employee's wife predeceased him, and when 
he was killed, he left as sole survivor a sixteen-year-old son. The in-
surer paid the son $20 a week plus $5 more as called for by the statute. 
When the son reached eighteen, the insurance company stopped all 
payments to him. The son contended that although the $5 payment 
could logically be stopped, he was entitled to have the $20 payments 
continue until the maximum period for which his mother would have 
been entitled to receive compensation, i.e., 400 weeks, had been reached. 
The Supreme Judicial Court, reversing the decree of the Superior 
Court in favor of the claimant, held that the son was not entitled to 
receive any payments after reaching the age of eighteen or the age of 
maturity, on the ground that the child inherited no right to his 
surviving parent's share under the statute; rather that he was entitled 
to receive $20 a week because of his condition of minority only. The 
Court felt that when his status as a minor surviving child came to an 
end, so did his right to dependency benefits. By statute, when the 
surviving spouse's status changes through remarriage, her right to 
benefits also ceases, even before the expiration of the 400-week period.3 
'" 1954 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 429, 119 N.E.2d at 391. 
18 See 2 Larson, Workmen's Compensation §59.20 (1952). 
§22.3. 1 G.L., c. 152, §31. 
21954 Mass. Adv. Sh. 503, 120 N.E.2d 206. 
• G.L., c. 152, §31. 
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However, the statute itself clearly provides that surviving children, 
where no parent survives, should get the same benefits as that parent 
would have received as a survivor. A reasonable argument could be 
made that the Court should have held that, as the receipt of benefits 
for the 400-week period does not depend upon need, and as there is no 
wording in the statute to the effect that the mandatory period should 
cease when the child reaches eighteen, as is specifically provided for, 
for example, when the widow remarries, then dependency benefits 
to those minor children should not be discontinued before the termina-
tion of the period.4 
Another dependency case decided during the survey year, McFar-
lane's Case,5 involves the well-established rule of law that an employee's 
settlement of his claim during his lifetime for an injury that later re-
sults in his death does not bar the surviving spouse from later making 
her own claim for dependency benefits. The settlement, compromise, 
or release by the deceased of his rights under the act cannot bar the 
statutory rights of his dependents since their rights are independently 
created by statute, and do not mature until the death of the employee.6 
The deceased employee's widow participated with her husband in 
signing the lump sum agreements settling his case. The Court held 
that although the usual rule of law still prevails generally with respect 
to the widow's dependency rights after a settlement obtained by her 
husband, "There is nothing in the workmen's compensation act which 
takes this unmatured right out of the general rule that a right which 
has not arisen may be released or made the subject of a contract not 
to sue." 7 
Since there was nothing in the record regarding the circumstances of 
Mrs. McFarlane's signing of the lump sum agreement, the Court sent 
the case back to the Board so that evidence could be taken on this point. 
The McFarlane decision seems to assert that if the widow had signed 
the lump surp agreements for a consideration, rather than as a witness 
or as an accommodating party or the like, then she would have lost 
her rights to all dependency benefits. Just exactly what the circum-
stances of the widow's signing would have to be in order for her to 
be deprived of these benefits is not set out in the Court's decision, but 
as stated, it would seem that she would have had to receive a separate 
consideration for her signature, since the right she could have been 
held to have signed away is too important to be lost for a simple 
accommodation. It should be noted in this regard that the Court 
employs the analogue of a covenant not to sue in connection with 
the wife's signature on the lump sum agreements. It would thus seem 
that if the signature is to be pleaded in defense to a compensation 
claim by the widow, the defense would have to be specifically enforce-
• Bott's Case, 230 Mass. 152, 119 N.E. 755 (1918). 
6330 Mass. 573, 1I5 N.E.2d 925 (1953). 
6 Cripp's Case, 216 Mass. 586, 104 N.E. 565 (1914); 2 Larson, Workmen's Compensa-
tion §64.l0 (1952) and cases cited. 
7330 Mass. 573,575, 115 N.E.2d 925, 926 (1953). 
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able, and it would be open to the widow to contend under general 
equity principles that this was either a hard bargain or an improvi-
den t con tract. II 
B. LEGISLATION 
§22.4. Redefinition of "employer." Only two bills amending Chap-
ter 152 of the General Laws were actually passed into law in the 
survey period. The first amends Section 1(5), and merely redefines the 
word "employer" as used in the workmen's compensation law, to in-
clude two or more individuals, partnerships, associations, corporations, 
or other legal entities engaged in a joint enterprise.! 
§22.5. Copies of medical reports for employees. Chapter 194 of 
the Acts of 1954 strikes out Section 20A of Chapter 152, and replaces 
it with a new, similarly numbered section intended to put teeth into 
the requirement that an employee who has been examined or treated 
at an insurance company dispensary or clinic should be able to obtain 
by himself, or through his attorney, copies of reports of all examina-
tions, treatments, diagnoses, prognoses, and the like, made by the 
insurance company doctors. 
The new Section 20A also states: "No such medical report shall upon 
objection by the claimant be admissible in evidence in any proceeding 
under this chapter, unless a copy thereof has been furnished to the 
claimant ... or his attorney within twenty days after a written 
request therefor." 
It should be noted, however, that it has always been the practice 
of the Industrial Accident Board to disallow any medical report in 
evidence upon objection of either party when the doctor who wrote it 
is not present to testify. And, of course, if the doctor is present to 
testify, the report is not at all important, except perhaps for the pur-
pose of reference. 
§22.6. Proposed legislation: Recodification. The most important 
legislation submitted during the survey year in the field of workmen's 
compensation was, of course, the 112-page recodification of the present 
law.! 
The bill was not enacted, but was referred to a Special Committee 
for study and report to the next legislative session.2 
As noted, the recodification is a document of considerable length, 
and it cannot be discussed in the space available in this chapter. The 
purposes of the recodification were asserted to be a "consolida-
tion, rearrangement, and recodification of the act without substantive 
8 Pomeroy, Specific Performance, §§192-197 (5th ed. 1941); Walsh, A Treatise on 
Equity §104 (1930); Pomeroy, Equity Jurisprudence §2211 (4th ed. 1919). 
§22.4. 1 Acts of 1954, c. 265. 
§22.6. 1 Senate No. 760 (1954). 
• House No. 2976 (1954). 
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changes." 3 At the legislative committee hearings this year, it was 
asserted by some of the speakers that the bill did actually make sub-
stantive changes in the law. This is perhaps inevitable in any exten-
sive recodification. Although periodic recodification has been deemed 
desirable in many fields, it may be questionable whether it is wise in 
workmen's compensation, where the often extensive litigation necessary 
to clarify new provisions is itself contrary to the purposes of the com-
pensation system. 
• Report of the Special Committee on Senate No. 760, p. 5 (1954). 
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